How Identity Underpins the State
The modern Jordanian state is at risk. I’ve written about this several times before. I don’t mean the physical nation-state - I mean the concept of Jordan as a modern state. I mean the state’s identity. The various actors in this struggle are not defined by class or ethnicity or country of origin. Those over-simplified labels do not hold up to data or recent events. Rather they are competing visions
By modern state, I use the criteria of an inclusive, responsive state, focused on diplomacy and global engagement. It limits both the clan-based communitarianism, as well as the hyper-individualism of more liberal capitalist states. It is the essence of a Weberian state.
Minority movements starting in 2018 adopted an openly pre-state opposition stance - a localist, xenophobic, ‘othering’ state. I will call this the pre-state position. They harken back to the older history when communities were communitarian internally, but libertarian externally, preferring little state interference in their affairs. Decision-making occurred in the traditional patriarchal leadership formats of tribal policy.
A more recent movement that we see is also opposing the ‘modern state’ identity that Jordan adopted. We’ll call this the ‘New State’ position. This is very driven by online (and some offline) grievances about the global position of the Middle East and how Jordan should react. These two groups are not debating, opposing, or demanding tweaks and minor reforms. Both groups demand fundamental change to Jordan and both are pulling it in opposite directions. Both of these groups operate in a national identity vacuum.
Three things you should know:
The Pre-State: In recent years, we have a pre-state movement rising in Jordan. It is not the same as the nationalist trends we see sweeping Europe (those largely driven by ethnic, religious lines) but there are some common factors. It is very.online, Its street activity is masked by economic and employment concerns while introducing more divisive and dangerous questions. The pre-state narrative came out in a dramatic, almost cinematic, clash between MP Osama Al Ajaramah and the state. Like many nationalists mourning the ‘good old days’ those days never really existed. After all, no one is clamoring for the Ottoman or British occupation. The closest historical moment was in a very young Jordan before the state had consolidated power and tribes held a monopoly on power. The “sons of soil” were the rightful owners of the land and thus the state and this is what they want to return. These movements and groups oppose all and any policies aimed at inclusion of different components of our society including equal opportunity (e.g. women). I have explored the rise of such rhetoric and the different manifestations of it in depth in this piece.
The New State: An undercurrent from the war on Gaza, and an undercurrent of last week’s events and assassinations is identity. What is Jordan’s role in all this? Jordan’s foreign policy plays a large role in identity. In the past decades, Jordan has developed a stellar reputation for diplomacy, mediation, balancing relations with neighbors, and ensuring (domestic) stability. But the regional events spark questions: What are the identity influences of Palestine in Jordan? Are there social fault lines in Jordan that have widened with recent events? What should Jordan’s relation with Iran be? In the age of social media rage, any foreign policy step drives comments and rebukes and hot takes. Israel’s brutal war on Gaza, disregard for international law and its continuous attempts at starting a wider regional conflict has ushered in a very angry movement that is demanding a fundamental change in Jordan’s outward identity and positioning in the region. A movement that is opposed to Jordan’s historic role as mediator and moderator. Their demands vary from cancellation of Wadi Araba agreement to legalizing armed resistance against Israel. In other words, demanding Jordan become a voice of “resistance”. Many of them also see Iran as a leader of this resistance. But proximity to Iran sacrifices many of the virtues which Jordan spent decades building.
The Modern State: The modern state has been the course of Jordan for decades. Jordan’s outward facing identity - moderate, mediator, diplomacy-focused, long-term vision, with almost everything seen through the filter of regional and domestic stability - is set. What is its domestic reflection? Granted, we take our time. In 2021, Jordan started a process of political ‘modernization’ - essentially the implementation of the King’s Dialogue Papers written almost a decade earlier envisioning an inclusive, vibrant political sector with representative political parties, fair elections, and decentralized governance. Importantly, the book which emerged from the 92-person committee which developed the implementation plan highlighted the goal of creating a national identity. Essentially, besides a passport, what does it mean to be a Jordanian? What can the men, women, Christians, Muslims, Arabs, Chechens, Circassians, youth, elderly, citizens with disabilities all hold on to in common as an identity? Jordan has officially laid out the need to create a national identity. It has made it the goals of its inclusive reforms.
My Take:
This is a moment often overlooked where domestic politics meet global politics. There is ALWAYS an overlap, but it rarely gets in behind the headlines. This is especially true in the Middle East where it is easier to look at breaking news, and never look at the long-term trends which may be driving it.
This is a problem which Jordan may share with Iraq - another state with 20th century borders which is blending elements of Sunni, Shia, Kurd and different types of governance. Lebanon is a very different experience where communal identity is very strong. But also, look at how Lebanese identify online - especially among the Diaspora. There is a lot of pride (but also hate) in Lebanese identity. Identity in the Gulf is very centralized and very tied to state management structures. So identity issues are common in the region but Jordan is unique. I highly appreciate the steps to create political parties, the new Parliament structure, the new Election law, and the gradual 12 year approach to expanding it. But let’s not forget the goal of creating a national identity. (If we are counting on the parties to gradually pull in the public to identify as part of the political process, let’s be more realistic. As we’ve seen the past months, most of the 38 political parties can’t even justify their own existence, let alone give a reason why a voter should support them.) Where was the robust communication campaign to get the public on board. (and the campaign to get the elites on board!) Have there been public discussions on identity I’ve missed? Did the Ministry of Education or any Universities support it? Where has the government been? The unity we gained from the Covid crisis has been squandered. The opportunities with political modernization have been underused. In retrospect, more outreach on this would have been useful before October 2023.
How does this tie into regional events? It would be nicer if we had spent much more effort since 2021 on building that national identity. It would balance us away from the extremes of the Pre-state and the New State. We need a lot of data on how Jordanians view their relation to the state and how they identify their role in their nation. We need roundtables for citizens to express their concerns and gradually identify their own views and goals. We need a school curriculum which builds national identity and patriotism and unity. Finally, we need state structures and a state communication strategy which underpins this campaign. If we had done that we would be much more prepared.
The two competing ideas - pre-state and new state ideologies - are undermining the state and this affects its global position. Citizens do not need to always agree with their leadership - citizen oversight and disagreement with leadership is a pillar of democracy. But a unified national identity is an arena which defines citizen inclusion. Citizens will gain a sense of belonging, a feeling of representation and an awareness of their contribution to state decision-making when there are more responsive institutions, and also a national identity that honors their inclusion.
Identity not only bolsters political modernization and Jordan’s global standing, it also protects against extremist recruiting. As I have written before for Westpoint’s Sentinel, authentic political engagement is a counterweight to extremist messaging which targets the left-out and isolated.
My bias may be clear. The modern state is the only path that pushes Jordan forward as a state responsive to all citizens, offering opportunities to all citizens and maintaining long term growth. The modern state is the only vision that protects women. It is the only one that offers social justice. It is the only one that recognizes Iran for the danger that it is. The modern state is the only one that guarantees long-term regional leadership and stability. It is strategic. It is Jordanian.