The Trump White House has been moving incredibly quickly to dismantle USAID, but strangely, everything is still in limbo. The only thing that has changed since my first newsletter is that more Jordanians working for USAID projects have lost their jobs. With the looming US government shutdown, more chaos results in further Jordanian skepticism of the US. While many in Amman political circles may have had their grievances with USAID - Dead Sea resort trips for Members of Parliament is mine - the reality is that we are much poorer without them. USAID’s footprint was everywhere in Jordan, often working in rural areas or marginalized communities which needed the attention.
Now it seems that some water projects and maybe others will return, which adds a little more unpredictability to this, but ultimately helps our country. However, the longer term effects are still going to be very damaging. A major downside of all of this is the instability of the relationship with the US. USAID’s presence in Jordan has long been a part of a broader U.S. strategy in the Middle East towards stabilization. Another downside will be the smug victory of those against change, against inclusive representation, against the King’s vision for modernization. They will champion the old ways of work by the Old Guard. Deeper research should be done on the winners and losers of the USAID dismantling. The consequences will affect us all.
Three Things You Should Know:
Jordan’s Neighbours:
Jordan is, of course, not the only country facing massive USAID cuts. First, USAID had multiple projects focused on Syria - support for refugees, media, community support outside Assad controlled areas, humanitarian support, and several other things. Now Assad is gone. It could be the time for peace-building, community development, and humanitarian relief. Given the violence we recently saw on the Syrian coast, additional engagement could be leverage for stabilization. But, no. Also, Lebanon finally has some good news for stability with the new president Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. While military aid has been approved for Lebanon, there are tremendous deficits in infrastructure, basic services, municipal structures, and private sector development. Iraq also has lost millions in USAID from their public and private sectors. When Jordan’s trading partners decline, trade worsens. When the region looks unstable, tourism suffers. Jordan needs stable, developing partners on its borders and as trading partners.
We also need peace and stability on our borders. The conditions that previously enabled pro-Iranian factions to expand their influence remain unchanged. Without USAID-backed counterprojects offering alternatives in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, extremist groups can gain space to provide services and build legitimacy. This weakens not just U.S. soft power but the very stability USAID sought to promote.
Economic Madness:
We all knew that donor dependency was a threat in Jordan. However, we perceived the threat as potential negative leverage by the US - using the large funding as pressure to force Jordan into bad policy positions. We also worried about the aid being cut. We did not foresee the aid disappearing within a matter of weeks, not only from Jordan but from the region. Previously I wrote about the dangers of brain drain and capital flight. There are numerous other results. First, over a hundred foreign expat families are packing and leaving, breaking that small housing market that rents apartments to expats for 25,000 JOD a year. As elite housing takes a hit, that effect trickles down. (I’ll just say now that all these effects trickle down. Ultimately they all affect prices, decrease tax revenue, lower business for local suppliers and service providers, and strain employment in other sectors). USAID projects usually included targeted programs for vulnerable communities, such as refugees, low-income households, and rural women. With these supports at risk, there could be a widening of economic inequality and increased pressure on public social services, potentially leading to higher poverty rates. Polling already showed the main grievances were over perceived inequality in justice, unequal access to services, unequal representation, and income inequality which many believe is due to wasta. Real or imagined, inequality is an area of growing discontent and the closure of any opportunity to the unemployed, the unfairly treated, or the already aggrieved is contributing to future protest. Finally, USAID focused a lot on women - particularly women’s employment. Jordan already has the lowest female labor participation rate in the world. Our economy suffers when one half of the population faces market barriers. Additionally, a main challenge is small and medium business. This struggling area is now losing what little support it received, further threatening our feeble private sector.
Popular Anger
How do you help a society deal with anger? Even before Trump’s inauguration, and before Jordan’s September 2024 parliamentary elections, public anger was palpable. The economic outlook offers little relief: Jordan’s social security system may have only 12 years before insolvency; and professional associations, such as the Engineers’ Association, face impending pension crisis. Water scarcity is projected to worsen, exacerbated by population growth and the potential arrival of additional refugees from Gaza, the West Bank, or Syria. Core economic pillars—industry, tourism, and agriculture—are water-intensive, making these shortages even more dire. Taking in any refugees from Gaza, the West Bank, or Syria (if the fighting worsens again) would further strain water availability. Due to regional instability, it will be a while before tourism recovers and that affects restaurants, hotels, transport companies, guides, and other small businesses. Political parties should be the vehicle for advocacy and venting by the public. Support from USAID should have built these parties into capable institutions that offer alternatives and provide political identities to our youth. They would also offer competition to (currently) the only effective party - the Islamic Action Front. So, withdrawal of USAID support not only contributes to the frustration of the people over the economy and infrastructure, but it also weakens a way to express themselves with the new parties. Research continually showed that the only ways Jordaninas feel they are heard by leaders is through protest, civil disobedience, and online activism. I would speculate that over the next months as the economy fades and larger problems loom, we see the new party system dissolve and protests increase.
My Take:
In Jordan and in the region there are two winners: in Jordan its the Islamic Action Front. First, for years the IAF has warned against dependence on the US, and that the US is not a trustworthy partner. Now they can speak directly to all the suddenly unemployed accountants, drivers, program assistants, and indebted partners of these projects that disappeared and say, “See?”. It also helps that the points that the IAF criticized - gender, LGBTQ, inclusion - are under attack by USAID’s own (acting) leadership. “See?”. Finally, the IAF already benefited from its political comms regarding Gaza. A fickle US partner and reignited violence against Gaza is a gift just before local elections (and revved discussions of decentralization). The IAF is already benefiting from its 2024 electoral victories. (For insight on those victories, I have created an interactive map of every polling station’s results, matching the local and national list results, as well as crossing those regions with available research data).
The second beneficiary is the Old Guard. Out with the new, in with the old. USAID’s remaining funds will likely shift toward direct budget support, defense, water infrastructure, and select private sector projects. What’s being eliminated? Support for civil society, advocacy, municipal and political reform—initiatives that challenged the status quo. The implications are stark: efforts to increase women’s and youth participation in politics may stall or regress, and even party-based political processes could lose official backing.
The last RASED report on the September election was damning - “serious structural concerns”,”electoral bribery" "widespread practice of vote-buying" "paid rankings within party lists" "doubtful integrity of party-based elections”.”excessive and unmonitored spending”. The blame is on the parties, and it's not the IAF. The report casts doubt on both the Election Commission's handling of parties, and the integrity of the parties themselves. Political parties, an aspiring alternative to tribal and local patronage in elections, could face decline. Lack of an alternative, less inclusions, less advocacy for reform and oversight. With fewer advocates for reform and oversight, Jordan may be entrenching its traditional power structures.
In the region, Saudi Arabia is rising in importance. Trump has placed Riyadh at the center of both his Middle East strategy and broader geopolitical negotiations, including those with Russia and Ukraine. His first presidential visit will be to Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom has shifted from the major player in the region, to a major global player (and a White House favorite). Politically, it will be important to stay aligned with Saudi Arabia. Economically, it also makes them the donor of power. Investment from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf will be necessary to create an innovative economy in Jordan. As the U.S. dismantles decades of soft-power investment, regional players—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar—have an opportunity to shape the future. Their rivalry is an open secret, and with Washington stepping back, they must decide on their own trajectory. They can capitalize on not only the vacuum the US has left, but also on the expertise that they leave behind. Historically, Gulf states have prioritized military support for allied factions in regional conflicts. Now, they have the chance to invest in state-building, economic partnerships, and lasting institutional reforms. The moment is ripe for a shift from conflict-driven interventions to long-term governance and development initiatives.. From Syria to Sudan - this is the time for state building, economic partnerships and lasting peace that can only be achieved through grassroots movements and investment in governance over war.