For over a year, I have been writing about the rise of the ‘force narrative’ in the Middle East. Whether armed non-state actors primarily sponsored by Iran or Israel’s war on Gaza and displacement efforts in Gaza and the West Bank the force narrative dominates this moment. This force narrative is not exclusive to the Middle East: the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Azerbaijan’s ethnic-based forced displacement of Karabakh, and the ongoing battle over the Nile between Sudan, Ethiopia, and Egypt.
What is exclusive to the Middle East is how the force narrative drives the new Islamic Awakening—one that is similar in roots to previous ones but differs in cause and outcome. Below, I will examine the main aspects and push factors behind the emergence of the Islamic Awakening in the Middle East a few decades ago and then build on it to analyze today’s Middle East and the current Islamic awakening.
Three Things You Should Know:
The Islamic Awakening Post-1967
The Arab defeat in 1967 and Israel’s takeover of land has primarily led to the rise of the Islamist narrative and groups. Many in the Arab world lost faith in the secular, nationalist, and leftist regimes in the region. The defeat weakened the legitimacy of these new states, giving rise to Islamic doctrines as a way to regain power and uplift the nations.
These Islamic awakenings were not exclusively Muslim Brotherhood or Jihadi groups. The four main manifestations of this Islamic awakening were:
The Sufi Islamist Awakening
The Salafi Awakening
Political Islam (mainly through the Muslim Brotherhood)
The Jihadi Islamic Awakening
These movements differed in goals and tools. The Sufi and Salafi approaches had more of a societal and individual salvation aspect to them.
Sufis focused on the individual's faith and adherence; the aim was not political or directed at power but rather focused on providing citizens with tools to bolster faith and commitment. It served as a way to placate an angry citizenry through focusing on individual purity and spiritual practice. Sufi orders were revived in Egypt like Al Shadiliya and Azamiya orders, similarly Sufi orders resurfaced in North African countries like Tunis and Algeria.
The Salafi movement emphasized preaching and strict adherence to Sharia laws, with a focus on the lives of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, rejecting modernity as a cornerstone of the movement.
Political Islam, primarily manifesting in the Muslim Brotherhood organization, sought power through political participation. They used social and economic initiatives to expand influence in the region, with the ultimate goal of seizing power.
Jihad movements adopted an armed approach to change, like Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad in Egypt, the Islamic Front for Salvation, the Armed Islamic Group, and the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat in Algeria, and of course, Al-Qaeda with its various offshoots in the region.
All these groups impacted society to varying degrees but collectively influenced the rise of Islamist narratives and the undermining of regimes across the region.
The Iranian Revolution as a Hope and Model
The Arab defeat of 1967 and the loss of trust and support for the nationalist and secular regimes in the region emerged during the same years followed by the Iranian Revolution which came as a supporting argument to the emergence of various Islamic awakenings.
For years, Islamic groups had been subjected to intense persecution and violence in varying degrees in the Arab world. This was particularly the case under nationalist, left-leaning regimes like in Egypt and Syria. Opposition actors were beginning to feel their fight against the system was futile until the Iranian Revolution surprised the region by toppling the Shah and reintroducing the concept of revolution as a vehicle for change.
Arab regimes, even the secular ones, tried to balance their laws with people’s desire for Islamic-based rule. They promoted the concept that Islamic law was not compatible with modern states and was more suitable for individual life. Thus they allowed civil law to be aligned with sharia while preserving other sectors for their own rule. Regime-dominated sectors governed most aspects of life, while religious laws—whether Christian or Muslim—regulated personal matters such as marriages, divorces, inheritance, and births. This allowed governments to maintain public satisfaction while continuing to build and craft their modern states with some distance from religious principles.
However, Khomeini’s rule presented itself as an achievable model for an Islamic-based state, contrasting with the secular regimes surrounding it. Khomeini not only revived hope in revolutionary success but also institutionalized Islamic laws within the state.
Beyond hope, the Iranian Revolution also posed a sectarian threat to Sunni regimes, who did not hesitate to create and sponsor a more radical Sunni movement in an attempt to undermine and isolate the Khomeini model from the Arab world, which is majority Sunni. These practices proved successful, and a lasting Iranian hegemony was created—up until recent years.
Great Powers and a Game of Pawns with Islam
Both the Islamic Awakening and the Iranian Revolution happened against the backdrop of great power competition. The Western world, spearheaded by the United States, was in a Cold War with the Soviet Union. This competition knew no borders other than their own. The two powers were eager to fight each other until the last man in any country except in their own home.
The Soviet Union adopted revolutionary and liberation movements in South and Central America, Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. In opposition, the U.S. supported liberal, authoritarian, and other groups that served American interests in those continents and in Europe.
In the Middle East, nationalist countries and monarchies sided with the United States (Shah’s Iran, Gulf monarchies, and Jordan), while more secular nationalist regimes sided with the Soviet Union (Iraq, Egypt, Assad). This allowed Islamic groups, which primarily operated against secular regimes like Egypt and Syria, some breathing room. In the Cold War, they were seen as another tool to undermine the Soviet Union and its allies.
The peak was in Afghanistan. When Soviet troops invaded, the U.S. saw an opportunity in the Mujahideen - not actually a united group but various fighter groups - to push back against the Soviet invasion. Foreign fighters had ease of travel, their home countries looked the other way when they recruited young men and women for the holy war against the Soviet Union, and in some cases, government officials even facilitated and financed this project.
While Afghanistan served as just another arena for Cold War competition, for Islamic groups—specifically Jihadi groups—it was a safe haven for training, preaching, and establishing a Sunni state model. Not long after they successfully defeated the Soviets, the Mujahideen set their eyes on their respective countries, craving to recreate the Afghan experience in their homelands. This led to the creation of Al-Qaeda—a legacy that still endures today.
By the 1980’s the Iranian Revolution was a model for Shia revolution while the struggle in Afghanistan - spawning the Taliban and Al Qaeda - did the same for Sunnis.
My Take:
The Islamic Awakening in the Middle East has withstood the test of time. Political Islam is still a key player in the region and Jihadi groups still attract youth and expand despite the war against terror. The events of the Arab Spring served as a platform for these different groups and their quest for power. Some were met with brutal and violent endings like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia while Jihadi groups went through transformations, internal divisions, and eventually evolution that led to the takeover of Syria and the fall of Assad regime.
History is echoing itself, but this time with fewer variations, deeper conviction, and a rawer sense of anger. In the wake of Hamas’s October 7th attack and Israel’s devastating response—which has left tens of thousands dead, the vast majority civilians—Arab populations have become increasingly disillusioned with the relentless cycles of injustice and violence inflicted upon the Palestinian people.
The past year and a half have only deepened this weariness, eroding faith in the international community and the pillars of international law meant to safeguard civilians and uphold human dignity. The sense of abandonment is widespread as well as a mounting crisis of legitimacy for modern Arab states, which many now perceive as powerless, indifferent, or even complicit in Israel’s war on Gaza and the continued displacement of Palestinians in the West Bank. This is a repeat of the psychological effects of 1967, a similar sense of helplessness that ushered in the Islamic awakening.
This distrust will ultimately translate to distrust and loss of legitimacy of the modern Arab States, that the people view as helpless, weak and sometimes even complicit in the Israeli violent war on Gaza and repeated attacks and displacement attempts in the West Bank - For months I have been following popular rhetoric, security trends and public sentiment. Across the board it is safe to say that our population has developed a disdain to what they see as western hypocrisy and complicity, the Iranian hegemony that was carefully curated over the years whether through official channels and state sponsorship or through Iranian aggressiveness and war crimes in places like Syria, has softened. The younger generation is looking to the Iranian led axis of resistance as a representative, a champion of the Palestinian people. Those who still view Iran and its proxy through a sectarian lens find their heroes and champions elsewhere, Muslim brotherhood for those who are not fully radicalized and terror groups for those who reached their breaking point.
Youth have lost faith in diplomacy by the international community and are leaning towards the force narrative, which they see used by Israeli and the non-state armed groups in the Middle East. Crowning this shift came the fall of Assad’s regime at the hands of the armed rebel coalition headed by Hayit Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS). HTS is led by Ahmad Al Shari’ (Abu Muahammad Al Joulani) a former ISIS emissary and Al-Qaeda offshoot, very familiar with the force narrative. This victory, awaited by Syrians for over a decade through one of the single most violent Arab regimes in modern history, was another example of hope in revolutions as a vehicle of change. However this time, it also came at the expense of Political Islamic groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and in favor of Jihad groups using armed resistance. The new Syria is now a closer, more influential Iranian revolution - providing hope for armed revolutions while still developing a model for other Islamists. For many, jihad was never only about toppling Assad—it was also a battle against historic enemies like Iran and Russia. That symbolism cannot be overstated, especially now, as the Middle East finds itself once again at a breaking point. Israel’s expanding military campaign—stretching from Lebanon and Syria to Yemen and even Iran—coincides with a broader effort to undermine its neighbors and former Arab partners.
In this shifting landscape, the old narratives of resistance and struggle take on renewed urgency, fueling the conviction that victory is not just possible but necessary.
While the Cold War is long behind us, President Trump’s disastrous meeting with Ukrainian President Zelensky made one thing clear—his Bismarckian approach to geopolitics, his infatuation with strongmen, and his disdain for soft power will only deepen the fractures already spreading across the region. For a population that already feels betrayed by the world’s silence on Gaza, by the weaponization of aid, by the relentless economic pressure wielded against them, armed mobilization is becoming less a fringe ideology and more a logical response.
This shifting baseline may prove to be one of the most consequential developments for the region and beyond. The Islamic awakening now unfolding is neither individual nor strictly political - it is transnational, deeply embedded in local grievances, and increasingly militant. Al-Shari’, in his attempt to co-opt the Syrian revolution as both a domestic and international PR campaign, has unknowingly co-opted something far greater: the hope for change and justice, carried forward on the banner of jihad.
The Middle East is changing and these alarming shifts are happening at a time where allies and partners are choosing to withdraw. US soft power served as a stabilizing factor to many countries in the region for decades. It engaged the citizenry, provided inclusive policies and encouraged dialogue both domestic and regional. At a time where diplomacy is most needed, we see it tossed to the side in favor of power politics, with the only way for self assurance is through violence.