Power on Shaky (Syrian) Grounds
The Syrian scene is developing quickly. President Trump announced dropping sanctions against Syria in what may be the most consequential speech since Obama’s speech in Cairo. (“The so-called nation builders wrecked far more nations than they built, and the interventionists were intervening in complex societies that they did not even understand. In recent years, far too many American presidents have been afflicted with the notion that it’s our job to look into the souls of foreign leaders and use U.S. policy to dispense justice for their sins”). With all the changes, there are still some daunting challenges. I think it useful for us to examine the threats that might undermine the new government in Syria. Different stakeholders look for different results from their engagement with Al Sharaa’s government. Europe wants a win against Russia by blocking Moscow’s relations with Damascus, and they also want to fast track refugee return. Jordan and Iraq want to contain any radical groups that might emerge near their borders. Turkey and Qatar are expanding influence in the region. The US - with the sour taste from its Afghanistan experience - may be sincere in letting Syria “chart its own path” in this new and avoid miring itself in another nation-building project. Regardless of all these interests, there is a consensus to keep Sharaa in power. In order to do so, we must examine the threats that can upend all the collective efforts.
Three Things You Should Know
The South Will Rise Again? The Syrian South is pressured by Israel’s strikes and occupation, plus their use of minorities (Druze) to justify their presence. Besides these, other factors (and groups) are rising from the dead. One group we should pay closer attention to is the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria (Ouli Al Ba’as) which introduced itself In January through Telegram channels and Twitter accounts under the name of “The Southern Liberation Front”. Its name, logo and the narratives all indicate Iranian influence or inspiration. In May Ouli Al Ba’as held its first conference where they announced the merger with other armed groups. One of those main groups is “Liwa’ Al Areen” which mainly operated in the city of Deraa following the 2018 Russian disarmament that ushered in a flood of IRGC and Iranian affiliated militias into the Syrian South. These militias served as major recruitment vehicles of young men, some reports claiming their membership was around 8000. While the newly rebranded Islamic Action Front primarily calls for armed resistance against the Israeli occupation of Syrian territory, they also focused on the new Syrian government, demanding more ‘representative governance’. This could pose a challenge to establishing control over the south and especially when they successfully bring in disgruntled minorities, such as Alawites or former regime members.
Alongside Iranian influence, the years-long chaos and violence in Syria’s South provided a perfect cover for terrorist groups to operate. In a past piece, I examined ISIS’s expanding presence in the south and how they operate. This has not changed much, though the group’s membership has dwindled and most of their operations and recruitment have shifted to the African coast. (You can read my in depth analysis of ISIS’s strategic revamp here). ISIS still has members operating in Syria and Iraq with some sources estimating the number of members to be between 400-600. This number might be small but still sufficient to carry out assassinations aimed at SDF and other rivals.
But for Al Shara’a, the more urgent threat to his government's legitimacy and power are the well organized and established groups in the south that do not recognize his authority in Damascus. Dara’a is regarded as the cradle of the Syrian revolution, and has hosted multiple well-trained armed groups. The Southern rebel groups catered to their demographic makeup by relying heavily on tribal ties rather than ideological ones - thus making these groups decidedly less “Islamic” than HTS or Ahrar As-Sham. This reliance on tribes and local communities made the Syrian south much harder to control or penetrate by outside groups. For example, Iran reverted to flooding the area with drugs to break down the social fabric of the community and establish conversion centers. ISIS’s recruitment efforts also failed - the community was resilient to ISIS fighters who they deemed as “outsiders”. So from this tight knit group these rebel groups emerged, whether it was the 8th legion led by Ahmad Al Odeh, Army of Free Tribes groups led by Rakan Khudeir, or Al Mrakaziyat under different leaders. This also allowed rebel groups in the south to operate more on local demands and needs rather than ideological ones. When the Russian disarmament agreement was brokered back in 2018, many of these groups communicated through domestic, international, and regional players, allowing them to further establish themselves as a the leading force, especially that Assad made little to no effort in building on the Russian initiative of reconciliation. Prominent leaders in the south had to relocate as part of that disarmament agreement and were allowed safe passage to Jordan, (many have since returned). HTS, which has long struggled to gain influence in the south, began using affiliated Telegram channels as early as January to discredit these groups by portraying their leaders as foreign agents and attacking their alliances. As recently as last Sunday Anas Al Zai’m (Anas Al Salkhadi), one of the returned leaders, survived an assassination attempt. Al Odeh, sitting holed up in the south of Syria, knows that his fate will be similar, especially after a skirmish with Al Sharaa’s security personnel and others who allegedly tried to defect from Al Odeh’s command.
While the Sharaa government deals with armed fractions in the south, another looming threat is religious influence outside that is changing the country from within.
The Shadow Theocracy: I’ve written about the reality of the new Syria where independent clerics issue fatwas (religious edicts) not in line with the new regime’s declared reform. These clerics also establish religious and educational centers promoting Jihadi doctrine and radical Islamic thought. Recent events such as the ethnic cleansing on the coast and attacks on the Druze should not be seen as old communal rivalries, but as results of new narratives expanding acceptance within Syrian communities. While Al Sharaa is in central Damascus with a handful of his loyal followers, the fighters in the field are seeking edicts from theologians outside of the state. For example, multiple Telegram channels now offer guidance to both Syrian citizens and fighters, covering a wide range of topics. Some questions are about everyday issues like inheritance and trade, while others focus on deeper concerns—such as the legitimacy of the new government or how Sunni Syrians should relate to fellow citizens from other Islamic sects and religions. Fighters often ask about the permissibility of taking loot from battles, which conflicts they should prioritize, and whether it is acceptable under Islamic law to form coalitions with "infidels" in fighting ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Queries from other Arab states question the legitimacy of their own regimes (the answer is almost always to overthrow them with any means possible), and starting armed groups in their own communities (again, the answer is a resounding yes). Central Asians seek guidance on political issues while Western based Muslims ask how to support the Mujahideen from abroad. This transnational shadow theocracy not only undermines Al Sharaa, but it also undermines neighboring regimes. Besides his own hardliners, other groups use religion to undermine the new government. ISIS, for example, is very active in creating “educational” channels to promote their violent and extreme interpretations of Islamic scripture; the “lessons” they focus on, politically undermine the new Syrian government and also inspire violence throughout the country. Their theological arguments are laser focused on the permissible use of violence against all those who do not follow their rigid interpretation of Sunni Islam. Basically they promote a takfiri agenda rather than promoting the group.
Great Expectations: As with any new government, there is a curse of overwhelming expectations on both speed and performance. In this case they are almost unachievable for three reasons. First, the depth of destruction from the war and the Assad regime is difficult to measure. Everything from infrastructure of roads and utilities down to the psychological trauma of hundreds of thousands. Every one of those traumatized groups will be in need of support and every region will need reconstruction and (rightly) will expect to be addressed soon. Second, there has been an opposition and a civil society which has speculated and prescribed what a post-Assad Syria should look like. Donors have funded research and roundtables and reports for years trying to shape international views on a future Syria (and of course, continue their funding from those donors). Now that the Assad regime has fallen these groups will try to find a new role for themselves by dancing their agendas on how Syria should develop. Expect accusations of ‘sidelining civil society’ if these myriad plans are not considered or these leaders aren’t brought into the new government. Third, there are a number of international players all with agendas to discuss with the new Syrian leadership - regional neighbors like Jordan or Iraq, power players like Saudi Arabia, Europe, Russia, China, Turkey, and cross border influences on the Druze and Kurdish and Christian populations. Despite those three pressures of reconstruction, diaspora civil society, and global partners, the largest expectation is transitional justice. Who will be held accountable for past crimes? What justice for those who were unjustly imprisoned? What about stolen property and stolen lives? Homes have been taken and property paperwork is missing. What about the hundreds of thousands that have disappeared in the prisons of Assad?
The new government will need to work to expedite a number of these items (especially justice and reconstruction) as well as seriously manage expectations.
There are also the expectations of hardliners that have been by the side of this new government since its early days, a big group both foreign and local that have been sold the idea that their fight will result in an Islamic utopia, by their own rigid standards. While they are by far lesser in number they are the most armed and militant, they can pose as the block on the road for a more tolerant Syria.
My Take:
While Al Sharaa is fighting to consolidate political power, he's losing the battle over the soul and identity of the state. I have warned about the new government's permissive tolerance of religious clerics to preach and teach independently from the state . This ‘tolerance’ allows maneuvering space, where Al Sharaa can chase his dream of power without having to deal with the challenges of governance. But the continued flare ups and assaults against non-Sunni Syrians, the hits on former regime employees, the attacks on nightclubs, and other Syrians are all evidence of how this government is losing control.
What does control of the Syrian state look like after almost five decades of brutal rule and almost 15 years of war? There are semi-autonomous groups like the Kurds and the Druze with their own governance areas that, during the war, actively fought the regime or actively ignored it. There are multiple splintered armed groups with their own religious and field commanders that have established their own doctrines. These challenges are not a new issue nor Syria specific. What is unique to the Syrian scene is that central authority faded a long time ago, when Assad chose to brutally punish his own people. The hollowing out of state institutions and loss of central control pushed that society to splinter into different local networks. These networks provided their members with security, services, and livelihood. The new government has inherited a broken state and needs to unite these splintered networks.
There are real governance issues to be addressed while simultaneously raising a nation from the ashes of civil/sectarian war. This is no small feat and the indications are not promising. While there is a rush to normalize relations and prop up the new Syrian government, many challenges are being overlooked that could undo its reconstruction. Al Sharaa still does not have a monopoly of power and does not seem to mind. His team seems to be banking on “rogue” elements to do their dirty deeds for them - whether by taking out political opposition, or cracking down on any movement which they deem might lead to a counter revolution. The justice many Syrians hope for is increasingly being used as a political tool. When public frustration grows, the government presents itself as the only source of justice—reminding people of past regime crimes they claim to have saved Syrians from.
Al Sharaa’s government has these daunting tasks and a short timeframe to make progress to satisfy a number of groups. Control over Syrian territory and a path towards justice for the people are the most urgent - otherwise reconstruction is an illusion and the people won’t accept the new authorities.