Jordan’s Political Landscape pt. 2
2024 is a year of elections. Sixty-four countries, plus the EU Parliament, have national elections this year. Almost half the world’s population will be electing national leadership. Some of them are weathervanes on geopolitics or democracy (13 January- Taiwan;14 February - Indonesia; 6–9 June - European Parliament; 28 June - Mongolia; 20 October - Moldova; 26 October - Georgia; 5 November United States) Others represent large populations (India; South Africa; South Korea) and some don’t really mean very much (Belarus; Azerbaijan; Venezuela; South Ossetia; Iran).
Then there is Jordan. Jordan’s elections really deserve more attention, especially the ones in September. But this is not an election for breaking news. This is an election that will establish trends which will reverberate over the next decade. Before we dive in, let me set some context.
Three Things You Should Know:
1.The Cycle of Reforms: Jordan has always been a ‘developing’ democracy ever since the end of martial law. King Abdullah II fueled several cycles of reform, always with the aim of a more inclusive, and diverse political sector. These included his Wall Street Journal op-ed, a Foreign Policy article, his commissioning of the Royal Committee for the National Agenda in 2005, and the National Dialogue Committee in 2011 which later resulted in the seven Discussion Papers on the King’s vision for the Kingdom. These Discussion Papers laid out was
essentially the vision for a more inclusive, and democratic political process. While the papers were lauded at the time, and provided a clear path for change, much of it was not implemented. Why? A lot of ink has been used from Jordanian columnists to US academics on this. Two reasons from my view would be 1) sensitivity around freedoms of speech, freedom of assembly, and the role of political parties 2) a LOT of regional distractions which continually placed security and stability above other concerns. There are additional issues of vested interests, public apathy, a dismal economy, the refugee burden on the economy, and an unwillingness to see how reform would bolster security, not undermine it.
In June 2021, King Abdullah II commissioned a 92 person Royal Committee to Modernize the Political System, led by former Prime Minister Samir Al-Rifai. This committee was more inclusive than any representative body in Jordan’s history - political parties, CSO, former officials, experts, academics, women, youth, minorities, and the “opposition” which mostly means Islamists, nationalists, and leftists. They produced a large document of recommendations with five chapters - Parties; Parliament; Women; Youth; Local Government. The first two chapters have been implemented with a complete restart to the political party sector, and a hybrid Parliament.
Now, this is not the full opening to liberal democracy. The reforms, or what are called, “Modernizations”, are really more about inclusion and less about democracy. After all, Parliament isn’t getting expanded powers and there isn’t real decentralization - yet. However, more citizen inclusion also means greater citizen oversight and greater representation.
2.A Cycle of (Breaking) Trust:
A 2018 report by the Economic and Social Council asked why Jordanians have so little trust in the state. A conclusion was that the state has plentiful initiatives, campaigns, project launches and innovations. However, time, money, and a lack of partners result in lackluster results from many of these. There is a lot of optimistic rollout but not much in terms of celebrating results. The report states that consecutive governments fail to deliver on promises, leading to citizen resentment.
How did this come to be? First, Jordan is very dependent on donor funds and as a result, donor projects. Through cooperation agreements we sign on to campaigns about energy, water, tourism, women, youth, small business, entrepreneurs, IT, public health, and education. These are worthwhile initiatives and usually sincere. However, these donor projects last 4 to 5 years while the people of Jordan are here for generations. If a project is cut short, redesigned, moved to another community, or fails, the negative perception goes to the sponsoring Ministry or to the government. There has to be some coordination, clarity on end results, and some real guidance from Ministries and the government on how all these fit together and whether they are sustainable. There is a lot of potential for success, but reputational risk for less than promised results.
Ministers change. New Ministers want to come in, bring their own team and ideas, and their own projects. The more frequently Ministers change, the more often we have new initiatives. The modernizations, where political parties play a greater role, will provide more accountability and sustainability. Parties will want to keep a brand of efficiency, while the current system is a carousel of individuals not held to account for results.
However, parties are adapting to the same problematic cycle identified in the report. On TV, a party recently said “we” will open a platform to connect job seekers with employers. Who is “we”? The party will pay for this platform? Or if they win sufficient seats in Parliament they will introduce a budget for it? Or is this public brainstorming to create an optimistic tone with no follow up? Parties cannot engage in the same trust-breaking comms of Ministries unless they want the same dismal trust as Ministries. Parties are running for Parliament and need to propose parliamentary actions, not aspirational ideas as if they will be Prime Minister.
RASED recently conducted a study of political parties, trying to pinpoint party programs. Through interviews with party leaders, RASED charts them on refugees, electoral participation, economics, social programs, and election results. The questions are vague but the answers are very problematic. RASED writes the majority of parties are ‘conservative’ on refugees (terms like right and left or conservative are used without definition. Both Mithaq and IAF are commonly seen as “conservative” parties. This is just copy/pasting foreign political terms without localizing them). Since almost no parties mention refugees in their platforms, this was just the personal opinion of the party leaders. Some of them said they don’t trust the election results. (!) Is that the position of the party or just the leader’s opinion? This is a trust-breaking report. It makes parties look like a single-person vehicle for power, which is what the modernizations aimed to change. Before answering the questions, party leaders should have responded, “I’ll ask the Political Council '' or “Here’s where it is in the program”.
3.Public Trends: Public trust is key. A recent IRI poll shows that while the mood of the Jordanian public is softening in terms of the outlook of the country and government structures, Jordanians are still hesitant to vote, and very hesitant to join a political party. A majority of Jordanians believe the situation with illegal narcotics has worsened, but also believe the government does a good job fighting crime. Jordanians also believe corruption has worsened, and that the government has not done a stellar job fighting it. The most popular reform proposal is strengthening oversight institutions. Price increases, especially for fuel, is the main complaint of over 90% of Jordanians. Looking over our political perceptions, Jordanians prefer a strong hand in leadership (our favorite leaders are Erdogan and Saddam), expect a generous social contract from the state, want a much smaller government, want low or no taxes, appreciate security and stability and respect the forces that give us those, are very resentful of Parliament and have been for years, don’t really believe in the elections (less than 20% believe them!) and are hesitant to get involved in politics ourselves. Yet, this somehow meshes with the modernizations. Jordanians appreciate local government, would like to see decentralization, want more youth involvement in politics (mixed feelings about women though), and many want strong political parties as part of the political process. We just want to wait and see who these parties turn out to be.
My Take:
Jordan finds itself in a unique position with few historic parallels which have been studied. That makes this a grand experiment. If I sound optimistic above, it is because I am.
It seems many Jordanians are optimists. But we are wary. We are optimistic of where these changes will take us, but we are carefully watching those first steps. We all want to wait and see. And there are several areas of concern.
First, there is a widespread belief that parties signed up citizens without their knowledge or against their will. Many of these stories are apocryphal. But in the Election Commission website you can enter your ID number and learn your party information. But wouldn’t I know if I joined a party? The IEC seems to be tacitly acknowledging that no, citizens may not know it. They better double check.
Second, our elections have been cursed by widespread vote buying for years. This is a major reason why over 80% of Jordanians don’t believe in the elections. Once you have been offered 20 or 40 or 50 JOD for your vote, even if you refuse it, you assume many people accepted it. You imagine that money is controlling the selection of MPs, not voter confidence. Once we get rid of vote buying, we will see citizen confidence return to the elections.
Third, not all party leaders seem to live in Jordan or plan to live here. Some still occupy jobs and positions abroad. Shouldn’t a servant of the people need to live with the people? I know remote work became popular after COVID, but get serious.
This isn’t criticizing the rules. Again, I am an optimist with modernizations. I am an optimist that more Jordanians can influence our government’s decision-making. But rules only count if they are followed. We all know that after the election, several parties will disappear. They won’t make it into Parliament. But more importantly than those who lose from lack of votes, are those who try to win through illegal means. This is about law enforcement. Dark money can kill the hope of the new Parliament before the first session. Instead of pushing us forward it would knock our youth back into a generation of apathy and cynicism.
Look again at the popular trends. Jordanians are more optimistic about where the country is going, more optimistic about reforms and parties, but concerned about corruption and want stronger oversight institutions. The exact opposite of that is dark money in political campaigns and elections.
The government and the Election Commission need to do more to reassure us. After the election we expect to see some candidates, and figures, and parties penalized for improper or corrupt practices. But we also can push transparency. Check your ID number on the IEC site. Do you know if you are listed as a party member? Don’t accept payment for your vote. Shame the people offering money for votes. Ask candidates and party leaders about where their money comes from. Ask for transparency. Ask for an election free of dark money.