Internal Survival, External Legitimacy - HTS’ Balancing Act
Regional and international delegations, conferences, interviews — this has been the life of HTS leadership over the past month. The central theme for all of these visits is to gauge just how far removed HTS has become from global jihad networks — primarily ISIS and AQ. While it is understandable and important to understand their connection or disconnection, our real concern should focus on the steps on the ground taken by HTS and what they actually signal.
Three Things You Should Know:
Legal Aliens in the State: After the fall of the regime, HTS worked quickly to consolidate power. The foreign minister, the head of the military, and the head of intelligence were all appointed from HTS upper leadership. But their most controversial move was the promotions within their military structure. Five individuals were promoted to colonel — four of whom were not Syrian. They came from different countries: Albania, Jordan, Egypt, and Uighurs from China. While some might argue the practice of promoting or incorporating foreign fighters is not specific to Syria but happened elsewhere in the world (Algeria, Albania, and Afghanistan — just sticking with the letter A), this leaves an incomplete picture. For example, in Albania, most of the foreign fighters were later arrested or repatriated to their countries (or handed over to the Americans) post-9/11 at the start of the Global War on Terror. Many of these fighters did not leave their ideological background and were involved in global jihad networks. Additionally, for Syria, the naming of a Palestinian-Syrian as head of the energy sector is notable. This type of promotion did not occur in Assad’s Syria. It also sends signals to the nation-states across the Levant where Palestinians are shunned away from high levels of power (ahem, Lebanon) and sensitive government positions are given based on identity. The Syrian army is now a multinational force. The Syrian state allows for Palestinian heritage. The Syrian leadership rewards loyalty, theology, and tenacity over citizenship.
Foreign Fighters Groups: The appointment of foreign fighters to key roles in government also means incorporating the groups they belong to. While HTS’ new approach claims to be about not allowing Syria to become a threat for other states — specifically its neighbors — we will have to dig deeper into HTS’ financial reliance on external and foreign jihadi networks. A lot of reports, for example, indicate the involvement of foreign fighters in creating HTS elite forces. Specifically, seasoned fighters from Chechnya and the Caucasus helped train and create these elite units (which, surprise, the new Jordanian colonel in the Syrian military was the head of).
The Unifying Factor: What does it mean to be Syrian now? Looking at the leadership, what unifies them? Previously, it was Baathist ideology (well, coercion and fear and choice-less devotion to one family). The unifying factor now is theology. This is not a diverse group of reformers awaiting Assad’s fall, debating economic and democratic reforms at donor roundtables in Europe. This is not a cadre of former officials working on a peaceful transition. These are battle-hardened men who have a singular agreement. What does it mean if the rest of Syria does not share this theological foundation? The Druze, Kurds, Alawites, Christians? If there is a theological gap between leadership and the people, one eventually compromises (usually it's the one with the monopoly on force. Given the lack of disarmament so far, this is a split decision).
My Take:
Syria is not united. The domestic front is not consolidated. The consolidation that is occurring is for power under Joulani. Also, it is within a transnational Islamic vision that falls in line with his years of action. The outward-facing policy is approachability, security guarantees, and openness. For Jordan, this means handshakes in Damascus, a worried eye on the uncontrolled Syrian south, and the angered realization that a wanted Jordanian terrorist is now a Syrian colonel. To be clear, Abu Hussein Al-Urduni left for Syria in 2013. He left and joined Al-Nusra, which, at that time, pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda. He left motivated by a call for an Islamic Ummah — a transboundary call that eliminates the nation-state and actually works against it.
I think there are two currents affecting the HTS government — one local and the other international. As an emerging power (HTS, not Syria), it needs to do everything it can to consolidate power with different groups — even those who have varying degrees of commitment, beliefs, and goals toward jihad, sharia law, and the modern state. For those groups, HTS could be symbolically hiring and advancing certain characters as a type of hat-tip to the global jihad networks, including allies and individuals that are still part of the wider group (and still have access to the wider funds). They may also observe the pragmatism toward regional and international players. HTS realizes that in order to keep power, it must provide for the citizenry — power, infrastructure, services, salaries. All of those cannot be provided without international backing and international investment in Syria’s reconstruction. Earlier in 2024, HTS was already feeling the pressure of failing to meet the needs of the community — there were protests against taxation, services, and corruption alongside infighting. HTS depends on international recognition and finance and is willing to play ball to get to that end.So, is the jihad hat-tip symbolic and the international outreach programmatic? Or are the handshakes with Western leaders symbolic and the jihad rhetoric the real pragmatism.
Last year I argued how the war on Gaza, Israel, and Iran’s policy of force and expansion are undermining the modern states of the Middle East. The inability of these states to stop the Israeli aggression and expansion, and the failure of the international community or international law to stop the horrors endured by the people in Gaza cause many Arabs to question the objectivity and effectiveness of global institutions. Now, this legitimacy and ideal role of the nation-state is being challenged again.
With HTS’ appointments and promotions of several non-Syrians — two images came to mind: 1) the ISIS fighters destroying the “artificial” borders between Syria and Iraq, and 2) multiple fighters burning their different passports — signaling an embrace and acceptance of a new transboundary state — an Islamic one. Syria could try to model a revolutionary state that erases national identity and replaces it with theological drive.
Maybe HTS has changed. Maybe they are genuine. But their media soundbites and actions send two completely different messages — one that might send shivers down the spine of different neighboring regimes — like the case of Ahmad Mansour and his videos from Syria dedicated to Sisi.