Firestarters: Is the Muslim Brotherhood on a Collision Course with the State?
Following the attack on October 18th, where two young Jordanians attempted to attack Israeli security from Jordan, a lot of speculation, accusations, and predictions floated about whether the Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, the IAF, were directly involved in the planning and execution of the attacks. Some celebrated the attack, while others condemned the IAF and MB for not only inciting young people to violence but leaving them unprepared. The IAF seemed to back the two attackers but then withdrew their support in light of possible consequences. Privately, they may continue to support such actions and applaud sending Jordan’s youth on such missions. In the September 10 elections, the IAF won a considerable victory and now will have 20% of Parliament. Their rhetoric as outsiders may need to change now that they are ‘inside the system.’ But what damage has been done so far, and what does the near future hold?
Three Things You Should Know:
1. What the Muslim Brotherhood is actually involved in: Some Jordanians have demanded legal action be taken against the Muslim Brotherhood for directly undermining national security and forming ‘armed groups’ that work directly against the state. The reality is more nuanced and less exciting. Faulty analyses citing unknown sources stated that the Muslim Brotherhood has active armed groups operating in Jordan. There is no evidence supporting such claims. These are sensationalist analyses or politically motivated chatter against the MB. Where the Muslim Brotherhood is actually actively involved is in weapons trafficking into Jordan and toward the occupied Palestinian territories. These operations do not involve the Jordan chapter since the weapons do not stay in Jordan. But they do involve their counterparts in Gaza and the West Bank (the destination) and Syria and Iraq (the suppliers). This is the main illicit activity the group is involved in. For this, its main objective remains outside of Jordanian territory—only using Jordan as a logistics base. I will write a deeper analysis of the weapons trafficking and how the Muslim Brotherhood fits into this trade in the coming few months.
2. Past events repeated: The MB and the IAF have consistently leveraged popular anger, particularly among youth, to serve their own political ambitions. Gaza is neither the first nor likely the last instance. When the United States invaded Iraq under George W. Bush, the MB capitalized on anti-American sentiment, channeling public outrage into protest movements and seizing the moment to amplify populist rhetoric for domestic gain. The Syrian revolution saw a similar strategy, and they are now employing comparable tactics amid the escalating violence in Gaza and Lebanon. And they are now recreating the same with the genocidal war on Gaza.
Compare this with the MB and IAF’s reticence during the Arab Spring, the 2018 tax protests, or the unemployment protests between 2019–2021 or the 2022 trucker protests. Their rhetoric was much less divisive, much less mobilizing, and, in general, well, much less. The Muslim Brotherhood's focus is not war but division. Before Jordan’s 2024 elections, they campaigned on a variety of issues, though never governance or economic reform. Prior to the October 7th escalation in Gaza, the Brotherhood specifically concentrated on gender and LGBTQ+ issues—trying to stir up a "moral panic" as a campaign strategy. As the ethnic cleansing in Gaza unfolded, they quickly pivoted, seizing the moment to capitalize on public sentiment to galvanize support.
3. The real threat: So what is the real threat? Young men and women who have been recruited, radicalized, and courted by the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan for political gains. They make promises and issue inflammatory statements with no real intent to follow through since the leadership is interested in power and their access to it. This leaves a wide number of riled-up youth looking for follow-through. Sometimes, when you light a fire, it spreads before you can put it out. IAF campaign rhetoric spoke of resistance, nostalgia for the 1967 war, sharia in Jordan, and jihad against the occupier in Palestine. After the two men shot at the border, the IAF supported them but climbed down from its rhetorical tree 24 hours later to avoid political consequences. They have been through this cycle before—stirring up youth for effect but without intent. One of the biggest examples of this is the schism that plagued the Muslim Brotherhood during the Syrian revolution, where a majority of the MB youth wing departed from the mother organization and affiliated themselves with more radical groups. We saw a spike in recruiting for IS, HTS, and Hurras al-Din. Outside polling from firms like IRI shows that the younger generation is becoming more conservative, especially on issues of gender. What if this same trend—and likely it is—exists within groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, where it’s the younger generation that’s going to be the more reactionary? The younger generation is, the more conservative. This is where the threat lies, and this is where we need to focus our analysis and research to avoid the radicalization waves that followed the invasion of Iraq and the Syrian civil war.
My Take:
Months ago, Jordanian authorities thwarted a terrorist attack, safely disposing of explosives the suspects had prepared. The incident spurred sensational rumors and reports, alleging links to an Iranian underground group operating in Jordan. More recently, following a separate attempted attack, additional coverage speculated about armed groups affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.
If we believe all this hysteria, then Jordan, with a population of 11 million and around 90 square kilometers in size, has not one but two secret underground armed groups, and somehow we are able to maintain our trademark security and stability? We either enjoy divine protection, or we are drowning in sensational, politically motivated speculation that doesn’t identify real risk factors and threats.
Sarcasm aside, the MB's actions in Jordan are nuanced. It is ridiculous to think they have an underground armed group against the state. But more explosive than the weapons they smuggle is the rhetoric they spread to youth. This rhetoric is strengthened by the burning tragedy of what is happening in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon.
Right now, we have a heart-wrenching regional situation, newly explored political engagement by many, a new Parliament, a new government, high youth unemployment, and a population that needs to see something being done. Who is there to drive a wedge in these fissures and widen them? The Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF.
And then... It worked. The IAF was the voice of anger in elections, which provided a new opportunity for voters. You could vote for your local representative as well as a political party. People happily voted for the local voice that would benefit their community and then voted for the IAF in order to protest. Look at the people who voted for the IAF on the party list but did not vote for the IAF candidate in the single mandate or local lists. These are not IAF loyalists. These are people who have had enough and swallowed the IAF talking points.
The Muslim Brotherhood neither initiated nor directly confronted the state over regional conflicts. However, they risk young lives by exploiting anger and frustration for influence. With over a decade in radicalization research focused on Jordan, I’ve consistently warned of their narratives. The Brotherhood has a history of leveraging discontent to strengthen its position in a cat-and-mouse dynamic with the state, rarely facing accountability for the consequences of its tactics.
A Confrontation in Three Areas:
1. Politically: The IAF has 20% of Parliament and will be a formidable spoiler. While gaining parliamentary seats offers them influence, it also comes with new responsibilities. They can no longer rely entirely on street protests or oppositional rhetoric without risking credibility. If they continue to push incendiary narratives and protests, they risk being seen as obstructionists, undermining their position as legitimate legislators. However, if they focus on policy, they may alienate the protest base that got them elected. Balancing these two dynamics will be critical: the shift from rhetoric to tangible political gains may prove difficult for a party accustomed to fueling discontent without delivering solutions.
2. On the streets: They continue to drive protests and rallies, but as a parliamentary power, the IAF might have to recalibrate how frequently and intensely they resort to street-level action. Too much reliance on protests risks weakening their legislative credibility, especially as voters expect tangible results from those holding parliamentary seats. Moving away from constant agitation, however, requires providing alternatives, which the IAF has historically struggled with—particularly in areas like economic reform or governance.
3. Rhetorically: They are driving up sentiment that they may not be able to pull back. Campaign promises centered around resistance and nostalgia for 1967 have created expectations among their supporters, but the realities of governing might compel the IAF to tone down their rhetoric. If they temper their messaging, they risk losing their base; if they maintain inflammatory rhetoric, they may alienate moderates and invite state crackdowns. This delicate balancing act will define their political strategy moving forward.
So the question remains: with these three head-to-head confrontations, how will the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF escalate? They may be pushed by their younger members and lower ranks to go further, following patterns from their own history. Do we really think that the IAF will send all these members to Parliament, roll up their sleeves, and start tackling issues like agriculture, water management, or vocational training programs? Or will it be Armouti times 30, with the focus shifting to Instagram and YouTube—chasing viral moments of rage and denunciation rather than actual governance? My money is on the rage.
We will soon find out with the first sitting in Parliament in mid-November, we will see how the IAF and MB will balance all their tactics. Their previous support for the two shooters is a mistake they likely won’t make again. When they need to distract from an error, they always turn up the heat domestically. Look at how quickly they pivoted from the border shooters to new protests in front of the U.S. Embassy. As a parliamentary power, they may move away from street protests. Also, they will need to provide something to the protest electorate that gave them those seats. What are the small victories they can claim early on to keep building their base? Hopefully, it will be for local developments and economic plans. Unfortunately, though, it may be too late to halt the consequences of their previous rhetoric and use our youth as political pawns.