Divide and Hit: How ISIS is Planning its Comeback
Thirteen years after the start of the bloody Syrian war (2011), chaos and lawlessness have become a way of governance, specifically in the south of Syria. It once hosted an ever-shifting mosaic of armed groups—Hay’it Tahrir Al Sham (HTS), the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS), the Free Syrian Army (FSA), the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and many others. While HTS fighters left the south for Idlib after the Russian-brokered disarmament in 2018, other groups remained and continued to operate. One of these groups is ISIS. After the international coalition’s successful campaign against the terrorist organization in 2018, ISIS had little to no presence in the South, with most of its fighters fleeing to the Syrian desert. However, in the following years, ISIS restarted its operations, primarily due to the chaos and violence in the region. Iranian-backed militias were operating freely, drug trafficking was rampant, and regime forces were still cracking down on local communities. It was a trifecta of theological enemies, lawlessness, and injustice. This allowed ISIS to begin to thrive once more. Additionally, former armed opposition groups were striking deals with the regime, operating alongside international actors to maintain a semblance of stability in the south, allowing ISIS to claim themselves as the only ones still fighting the regime. One of the main groups is Shabab Al Sunnah (Sunni Youth) led by Ahmad Al Odeh, which we will come back to later.
Against this backdrop came the quick fall of the Assad regime and the rise of Joulani and his now reformed extremist group, HTS. All of this is helping ISIS to create a narrative similar to that of Iraq circa 2005, and their main target is the Syrian South. ISIS is hoping to turn Daraa into the next Fallujah.
Three Things You Should Know:
Tame and Enlist: This was the title of ISIS’s editorial piece in their official news magazine Al Naba’a that came out last week. In this article they laid down the theological arguments against Joulani. This is not intended for your average conservative Muslim but for those who have already adopted a more radical, jihad-based worldview, such as Al Qaeda (HTS) supporters and ISIS affiliates. It is clear that ISIS is undermining Joulani’s new “reformed” approach. “Tame and Enlist” discusses the journey of taming Joulani from a jihad enthusiast to a supporter of a conservative Islamist governance project that enlisted him to serve two goals: 1) create an acceptable alternative to Assad and 2) fight those who are still jihad-oriented. ISIS draws comparisons between the government of the Taliban and Joulani’s own in Syria. In this piece, and across their online platforms, they resurrect the “Al-Sahawat” (the awakening) narrative—a reference to the Iraqi tribes and former Saddam officials who united against the rise of Al Qaeda led by Zarqawi. By using such comparisons, ISIS calls to mind U.S. involvement, reminding readers that Assad’s fall is not the ultimate goal; establishing Islamic rule should be. For ISIS, that cannot be done with U.S. cooperation.
The New Sahawa: While ISIS casts a broad hit against the entire Joulani-led government, it zooms in on one particular area and one particular group: The Syrian south and Ahmad Al Odeh. Al Odeh is a leader of the Sunni armed group Shabab Al Sunnah, which was part of the FSA. Following the Russian-brokered disarmament in the south, Shabab Al Sunnah was integrated with the Russian-backed Fifth Corps and later rebranded as the Eighth Brigade. Russia used the Eighth Brigade as a parallel governance structure. They operated somewhat independently from the regime forces and facilitated reconciliation between the regime and local communities. This transition—from a Sunni armed group fighting Assad to an unofficial partner of the regime and Russia—made them ISIS’s prime target. The chaos of the south provided fertile ground for violent covert operations, and Al Odeh’s “betrayal” and track record of corruption made his group an easy mark.
After Joulani visited with Ahmad Al Odeh and the Eighth Brigade, basically signaling endorsement, local communities expressed displeasure and anger. For them, Ahmad Al Odeh was an extension of the Assad regime and the recent lawlessness. ISIS quickly seized on these grievances. Their messaging emphasized Joulani and Al Odeh’s budding relationship, even featuring their group photos in ISIS’s magazine. The goal was twofold: 1) undermine the new Joulani government, and 2) ensure the south remained in turmoil so they could establish a base among the aggrieved. Since last week, ISIS has focused on the Eighth Brigade, for example they aggressively circulated leaked recordings from a 2018 MOC meeting where Al Odeh met with intelligence representatives from the US, UK, Jordan, and UAE. The discussions centered around Al Odeh’s role in combating ISIS. Later, ISIS circulated documented incidents of Al Odeh and his group’s attacks on local communities, their collaboration with the regime, and their role in the crackdown on the south.
Eliminating the Threat: For ISIS, one particular group poses a real threat - the SDF. This group is the most trained, best equipped, and funded by the US and its allies. For years, the SDF focused on combating ISIS, operating Al-Sinaa (Ghweran) prison where a large number of ISIS fighters were held. ISIS attacked the prison in 2022, demonstrating its ability to carry out complex operations and strategically choosing targets to regroup. The significance of the SDF being targeted should not be understated. ISIS frames the SDF as a tool of Western interference and a legacy of non-Islamic rule. As part of their attempt to undermine the SDF, ISIS circulates graphic videos and documented cases of abuse carried out by SDF members against the local Muslim community. For example, last Thursday two people were killed and several others injured when SDF forces fired at locals in Raqqa celebrating the fall of Assad. ISIS capitalized on this tragedy, pushing for the ouster of the SDF or at least an “institutional” uprising against them. On Friday, ISIS carried out an attack against an SDF checkpoint. They employ two patterns of engagement against this group: 1) call for the disarmament of the SDF by promoting the Turkish narrative against a well-armed Kurdish entity, and 2) conduct armed operations against SDF targets in the hope that more local Arab Muslim community members will join their fight.
My Take:
At the start of this piece, I suggested that Daraa (and the Syrian South in general) might turn into the new Fallujah. However, I am not as optimistic about the fate of the south as one might have been about the denouement of Fallujah in 2005. The Anbar region of Iraq possessed a monolithic tribal network wielding substantial social and local authority, and an ability to mobilize. Ex-Baathist officers brought institutional capacity to help organize. Additionally, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was new, foreign, and a direct threat to an established local elite, allowing them to unite against a single foe.
In the Syrian south, the situation is very different and more dangerous. While there are tribes and influential families, they are fractured after years of conflict and displacement. Iran’s long-standing presence in the South directly targeted and dismantled tribal cohesion and authority. Unlike the former Baathist officers in Iraq, there is no large pool of sidelined, professionally trained former regime officers able to organize effective local militias. They will not be allowed to. Moreover, ISIS is not as foreign as AQI was in Anbar. While equally brutal, ISIS has operated, recruited, and preached in Syria for over a decade, and their savagery is matched by other groups in the country.
Joulani’s shift from extreme right to center-right will prove consequential for many who do not necessarily agree with his new brand. Recently several accounts that previously praised HTS are now openly criticizing the adoption of the state model at the expense of vicegerency. Propping up groups with a spotty track record in the south will further alienate communities. Focusing on the SDF to please Turkey, rather than prioritizing the fight against radical groups like ISIS, will also benefit the terrorist organization.
Mainstream media focuses primarily on whether Joulani reformed or not. While this is important we must focus on the multitude of dynamics and interconnected groups still operating on the Syrian stage. One group in particular should not be forgotten - ISIS. They are working to shift public opinion against Joulani by invoking the bogeyman of the U.S. They are also trying to turn public sentiment against the SDF, framing them as violent thugs. By driving these groups and local loyalties against one another, ISIS is actively fostering violence. At the same time, they use their own capacity for violence, waiting for strategic opportunities to strike.